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INTRODUCTION
Following Adam Smith, all economists until Johnson (1950) have considered sharecropping to be a "practice which is hurtful to the whole society", an unexplained failure of the invisible hand that should be either discouraged by taxation (A. Smith) or improved by appropriate sharing of variable factors (Schickele (1941) , Heady (1947) ). Johnson (1950) starts from the empirical observation that "the deviations from optimum (induced by sharecropping contracts) are not immediately obvious from a cursory examination of American farms operating under different types of tenure arrangements". He then argues that the landlord can approach the desired intensity of cultivation by detailed contracting and monitoring, by providing other inputs and keeping the size of the individual unit small, to decrease (by an income effect) the farmer's marginal disutility of effort, or by the use of short-term contracts. However, he admits that his theory does not quite explain why sharecropping contracts seem to do as well as rental contracts.
The next main step' in the understanding of sharecropping was achieved by stressing tenants' risk aversion. The rental contract does not provide an appropriate sharing of risk. Sharecropping results from the trade-off beween incentives and risk sharing (Stiglitz important role played by financial variables in explaining the type of contract selected by a landlord and a tenant. Concluding comments are gathered in Section 7. A similar survey was undertaken in 1988 with somewhat less care. We will use data from it only to test the robustness of our results (see the appendix for more on the data).
THE

CONTRACTING WITH FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND MORAL HAZARD
As recognized now in the literature (see Reid (1987) , Singh (1987) ), the theory of sharecropping is best viewed as a sub-field of the theory of the firm. One cannot expect "one particular explanation of managerial structure to be uniquely powerful over a long period of time and across many cases" (Reid (1987) , p. 565). Any model of sharecropping must stress specific features of the data to be explored. The purpose of this section is to develop a simple model incorporating the basic ideas we found useful in explaining the characteristics of sharecropping in El Oulja. The model will then be enriched to account for a number of interesting but secondary aspects of the contracting problem we study and to relax some assumptions of the basic model. The production function of an elementary piece of land, called a plot, is written:
y5=f(le, x) + -, f increasing and concave,
where y is output, 1 is the amount of labour input, e is the average level of effort applied to these units of labour (le= 1 is labour in efficiency units), x is the amount of other material inputs, and E is a zero-mean random variable. Land is owned by landlords who contract with tenants to organize production. A general contract is defined by three parameters (a, ,B, r) which are, respectively, the share of the product kept by the tenant, the share of material inputs paid by the tenant and the certain payment made by the tenant to the landlord. This general form of contract encompasses all types of contracts used.
A pure rental contract (RC) is associated with a = 1, ,B=1, and r> 0. A pure wage contract (WC) is associated with a = 0, ,B=0, and r <0. Any type of contract can therefore fulfill the first-order conditions at the efficient allocation of resources.
Assume now that, because of imperfections in the credit market, the working capital R of the tenant is limited. In defining an optimal contract, we must add the constraint: w+/3x*+ rR
but there remain multiple optimal contracts implementing the efficient allocation of resources.
Remark. Constraint (9) is an ex ante financial constraint. It says that the tenant must pay for his living expenses (w), for his share of input (,Bx*) and for an eventual rent The logic of the behaviour we postulate for the landlord is to obtain as much cash advances from the tenant as possible in the form of rent or material inputs. He then picks the lowest a compatible with the tenant's individual rationality constraint.
From (8) and (9) we have:
Rental contracts and sharecropping contracts with a high share of the product given to the tenant may be excluded by financial constraints and the constraint (10) is tight. It predicts a positive correlation between a and R that is easy to observe in the data. So far the model predicts efficient production, but we pursue the analysis by assuming that the tenants's effort levels are unobservable by the landlord (at least beyond some monitorable level). We continue to assume that material inputs, x, and labour, 1, are observable and consequently can be chosen by the landlord. However, e is chosen by the tenant. Hence, the moral hazard constraint5: Of a ,f (le, x) = yV'(1e).
(11 at If no financial constraint existed, then risk neutrality would enable the landlord to achieve an efficient allocation of resources by choosing a rental contract (a = 1). The tenant would then benefit from all his effort and would choose a socially optimal level of effort.
Consider now the landlord's optimization programme when both a financial constraint for the tenant and the moral hazard constraint (11) The allocation is now inefficient, p >07, the marginal productivity of labour in efficiency units is too high; the marginal productivity of inputs is also too low (if labour and material inputs are not complementary) with an ambiguous result if they are complementary. The complete comparative statics of this model is actually quite complex and will not be derived.
However, we can obtain the following proposition which summarizes the main predictions of the model.
Proposition 1. (i) The landlord's utility level increases with the tenant's working capital R.
(ii) Conditionally on the level of other inputs x, the level of effective labour le, and therefore the production level, y, are increasing in R.
6. We assume below that the individual rationality constraint is binding. For R small enough either there will be a switch to a wage contract (see below) or the landlord will prefer not to saturate the individual rationality constraint to induce some effort. For a fixed x it can easily be checked that dA/dR <0. Therefore depending on the production function either the constraint is always binding or it is not binding for R smaller than a threshold value. This helps explain why in practice the share of the product left to the worker is never less than 1/2.
7. Look at (19), and use the concavity off and the convexity of yV.
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Landlord Since we have assumed that the tenant's individual rationality level of utility is independent8 of his working capital, the level of utility for the landlord is decreasing when the tenant's working capital R decreases. Then comes a point at which the landlord prefers to incur some monitoring cost9 to ensure a minimal effort level and switch to a wage contract. The model so obtained is then compatible with the co-existence of all types of contracts that we observe in El Oulja'?.
In Proposition 1, the monotonicity of y and a in R is obtained only conditionally on x. This will be enough for the empirical work. The prediction of Proposition 1 (ii) will be explored in Section 5 where we estimate production functions testing for a positive dependence of production on R or a conditionally on x. Proposition 1 (iii) will be used to test in Section 6 the positive dependence of the contract choice on R conditionally on x (and also unconditionally). Figure 1 summarizes the analysis. What has not been proved is the 8. We may also expect (depending on the relative numbers of landlords and tenants) that the tenants with a lot of working capital will be able to extract more income than the others. In Figure I we have assumed that the bargaining power was in the hands of landlords, tenants being all kept at the di level. The other extreme situation would be the one where landlords would be kept at the same level and the increase of utility due to more effort (due to higher shares (due to higher working capital)) would benefit tenants. (see Bell (1989) for a bargaining model of sharecropping). In this paper we stay in the principal agent framework with u exogenous on the grounds that an excess supply of labour is endemic in El Oulja.
9. If af/la is bounded above, and the tenant is very poor (a very small), sharecropping incentives for effort are very low.
10. Actually, we observe only the values of 1/2, 2/3 and 3/4 for the parameter a in the sharecropping contracts. We will use these results to test that the landlord's wealth has a negative effect on the tenant's share and that the landlord's working capital has no effect on production for a Cobb-Douglas specification. Game theory has familiarized us with the idea that repeated relationships may solve moral hazard problems by relying on appropriate threats such as here threat of non-renewal of the contract (Johnson (1950) ). Financial considerations would explain the form of the contract and efficiency would be enforced by repeated relationships'3. We will test this idea by introducing the length of the relationship in the productivity equations that we will estimate.
(v) Family labour constraints
The preceding analysis has assumed that sharecroppers and tenants are not constrained in their use of family labour. This is particularly doubtful for sharecroppers who may be financially constrained in the land they can rent and therefore have excessive family labour in a world where unemployment is widespread. To distinguish the inefficiency of family labour in sharecropping due to low effort levels and the inefficiency due to excessive labour inputs we will introduce a dummy variable which distinguishes "large size" families from ''small size" families where the second effect should not appear.
See Dutta, Ray and Sengupta (1989).
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ESTIMATION OF PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
Our theoretical analysis suggests that the level of production depends on the level of the tenant's working capital. It is easy to exhibit a significant positive correlation between the level of working capital and production levels but the economic meaning of this dependence is difficult to ascertain given the high correlation between input levels and working capital. Instead we have chosen to estimate the effect of the contract type on the production levels'4. For given input levels, the level of working capital affects the type of contract chosen, therefore the levels of effort and finally the production levels (see Proposition 1). This procedure does not raise econometric difficulties if contract types can be considered as exogeneous in the production function.
First, we consider Cobb-Douglas production functions with inputs, family labour FL, hired labour HL, and other inputs M, and shift variables Z1, Z2, Z3 defined as follows: ZI = 1 when the farmer is the owner or has a rental contract = 0 otherwise Z2= 1 when the farmer is a sharecropper = 0 otherwise
Z3 = t x Z2 where t is the length of the relationship between the landlord and the farmer for a sharecropping contract (t is measured in months).
In the following regressions, Y denotes production per hectare and inputs are evaluated per hectare. A two-stage least-squares procedure is used for inputs HL and M. Next an exogeneity test on Z1, Z2 and Z3 is carried out.
For the 1986 survey (170 observations) we obtain (t statistics in parenthesis): 14. An alternative is to test the role of contracts in the allocation of resources by studying the dependence of input decisions on contracts. This approach was followed by Shaban (1987) who tested if differences in input intensities between rental and sharecropping contracts were significant. He considers that, with monitoring, marginal productivities of inputs are equated to prices, while, with no monotoring and sharecropping, prices are equated to marginal productivities multiplied by the farmer's share. We believe that the structural form representing sharecropping is more complex. We can only rely on input data when those inputs are included in the contract and presumed observable. For those (as family labour in efficiency units) that are not observable it must be taken into account that they are chosen by the farmer, but they cannot be used in the estimation. Indeed, if they were observable, they could be monitored. We have also explored an alternative explanation of these results suggested by a referee. More able tenants have earned more in the past, have now more working capital and therefore are likely to be given rental contracts. To eliminate this effect we restrict the analysis to young tenants (less than 35 years old) and obtain similar results.
In 1986 The significance of contracts in the explanation of production is very stable across these different regressions. In all the above regressions we rejected at the 1% significance level the hypothesis that the coefficients of Z1 and Z2 are equal. The type of contract matters in the explanation of production levels as predicted by the theory. Using for reference the results from 1986 we see that moving from a sharecropping contract to a rental contract increases production by 50% (compare e48 and e4-4). The effect of the length of the relationship between the landlord and the sharecropper is positive and significant. A three-year contract of sharecropping increases production by 38%. Independently of the 15. The exogeneity of the contract variables was also tested positively.
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type of contract the coefficient of hired labour is 50% less than the coefficient of family labour. The combination of a Cobb-Douglas production function and the modelling of labour in efficiency units lead to a specification where the effect of the contract is similar to a Hicks-neutral technical efficiency effect. To test the robustness of our results we change the specification by assuming that there may be a different elasticity of production for the amount of family labour in the case of rent contracts and in the case of sharecropping contracts'6. We obtain:
In 1986 With this new specification we also find that the coefficients of family labour in rent contracts and sharecropping contracts are significantly different at the 1% significance level.
It may be argued that pervasive unemployment leads to low efficiency of sharecropping due to excessive use of family labour. We then introduce a dummy variable Z5 which equals 1 if the number of family workers per hectare is larger than 2-5 and zero otherwise. The following result suggests the existence of this excessive labour effect (0 17 significantly different from 0-19 at the 5% level) but also confirms, for families of small size, the lower efficiency of family labour in sharecropping contracts compared to rent contracts (0 19 16. Because of the very high correlation between Z, and Z, log FL (which is 0 96) and the very high correlation between Z2 and Z2 log FL (which is 0-98) it is not possible to imbed meaningfully the two models obtained within a single model and test the retrictions to which they correspond. We could engage in non-nested tests but the purpose here is not to choose the best model, but to check the robustness of our result according to which contract variables affect productivity. Similarly for the sub-sample of young tenants we still get significant differences in the coefficients of family labour in rent contracts and sharecropping contracts. However the excessive labour effect disappears for young tenants. Finally, we look at an alternative specification of the incentive effects due to the length of the relationship t in sharecropping labour and to the share of input fJ paid by the tenant by introducing a parameter of sharecropping labour which depends on both t and fJ (for a given a a high fi means a high productivity plot which can support a high funding of inputs; the motivation of introducing fi is the discrete nature of a).
17. There is no reason to test for an excessive labour effect in rental contracts because tenants with rent contracts are not financially constrained and therefore should be able to rent enough land for all their family labour. Furthermore we are not interested in the pervasive unemployment effect per se, but rather in the difference in the efficiency of family labour, stemming from differences in effort, between rental and sharecropping contracts. 
A2 = 042
Again the coefficient of family labour in rent contracts is significantly different at the 1% level (5% level only for young tenants in 1988) from the coefficient in the sharecropping case (actually the sum of three coefficients computed at the average sample values). Furthermore, with this new specification we again find that the length of the contract significantly affects positively the productivity of sharecropping labour.
CHOICE OF CONTRACTS
The previous section has shown the effect of contract type on production. In this section we test the role of financial constraints and risk aversion in the selection of contracts.
The 18. An alternative explanation given by a referee uses risk aversion. The more working capital a tenant has, the more crops he plants. The more crops a tenant plants, the more diversified he is, so the less risk he bears for a given sharing parameter in the contract. However, we did not find any correlation between the number of crops (NP) and the size of working capital. Noting that f3i/6 is the most efficient estimator we can run Hausman tests. As is often the case in small samples the difference in the covariance matrices between probit and the re-scaled ordered probit parameters did not turn out to be positive semidefinite. Thus to compare the results we simply test that the coefficients of R' and W' are the same. For the coefficients R' and W' we obtain X2_statistics which are 5-66 and 0-43 respectively which are below the 1% significance level which is 6-63.
We can safely conclude that our assumption of the same choice model for the four regimes is not rejected.
Since the theory only obtained the predictions concerning the effect of working capital on contract choices conditionally on the level of inputs we also obtained the maximum likelihood estimators for an enlarged model with similar results. We have developed a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard and financial constraints. The unobservability of effort requires the use of incentive contracts to induce good effort levels. This can easily be achieved with rental-contracts which leave to tenants all the proceeds of their effort. However, the tenant's financial constraints make these contracts often impossible. The poorer the tenant, the smaller the share of the crop he will retain and therefore the less effort he will provide. Production functions stressing the role of effort have been estimated. They support the theory which predicts lower efficiency when the tenant's share of output is lower. However, this inefficiency is somewhat mitigated by the length of the relationship between the landlord and the tenant. The working capital of the tenant (and of the landlord) appear as significant explanations of the type of contract chosen by a tenant. Little empirical evidence was found for the alternative explanation related to risk aversion (assumed to be decreasing with wealth). However, the close link between wealth and working capital should qualify this last statement. 
